Network Working Group O. Friel
Internet-Draft Cisco
Updates: 8995 (if approved) R. Shekh-Yusef
Intended status: Standards Track Ciena
Expires: 4 September 2025 M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
3 March 2025
BRSKI Cloud Registrar
draft-ietf-anima-brski-cloud-14
Abstract
Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) defines how
to onboard a device securely into an operator-maintained
infrastructure. It assumes that there is local network
infrastructure for the device to discover and help the device. This
document extends BRSKI and defines new device behavior for
deployments where no local infrastructure is available, such as in a
home or remote office. This document defines how the device can use
a well-defined "call-home" mechanism to find the operator-maintained
infrastructure.
This document defines how to contact a well-known Cloud Registrar,
and two ways in which the new device may be redirected towards the
operator-maintained infrastructure. The Cloud Registrar enables
discovery of the operator-maintained infrastructure, and may enable
establishment of trust with operator-maintained infrastructure that
does not support BRSKI mechanisms.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-brski-cloud/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group
mailing list (mailto:anima@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/anima-wg/brski-cloud.
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Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 September 2025.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Target Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar . . 6
1.2.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST
Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Network Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2. Pledge Certificate Identity Considerations . . . . . . . 10
2.3. YANG extension for Voucher based redirect . . . . . . . . 11
3. Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Pledge Sends Voucher Request to Cloud Registrar . . . . . 12
3.1.1. Cloud Registrar Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.2. Pledge - Cloud Registrar TLS Establishment Details . 12
3.1.3. Pledge Sends Voucher Request Message . . . . . . . . 13
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3.2. Cloud Registrar Processes Voucher Request Message . . . . 13
3.2.1. Pledge Ownership Look Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar . . 14
3.2.3. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST
Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3. Pledge Handles Cloud Registrar Response . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3.1. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar . . 15
3.3.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST
Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar . . . . 17
4.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST Service . . . 19
5. Lifecycle Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1. Captive Portals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.2. Multiple HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.1. Security Updates for the Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.2. Trust Anchors for Cloud Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.3. Considerations for HTTP Redirect . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.4. Considerations for Voucher est-domain . . . . . . . . . . 26
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction
Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures [BRSKI] BRSKI
specifies automated and secure provisioning of nodes (which are
called Pledges) with cryptographic keying material (trust anchors and
certificates) to enable authenticated and confidential communication
with other similarly enrolled nodes. This bootstrapping process is
also called enrollment.
In BRSKI, the Pledge performs enrollment by communicating with a
BRSKI Registrar belonging to the owner of the Pledge. The Pledge
does not know who its owner will be when manufactured. Instead, in
BRSKI it is assumed that the network to which the Pledge connects
belongs to the owner of the Pledge and therefore network-supported
discovery mechanisms can resolve generic, non-owner specific names to
the owner's Registrar.
To support enrollment of Pledges without such an owner based access
network, the mechanisms of BRSKI Cloud are required which assume that
Pledge and Registrar simply connect to the Internet.
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This work is in support of [BRSKI], Section 2.7, which describes how
a Pledge MAY contact a well-known URI of a Cloud Registrar if a local
Registrar cannot be discovered or if the Pledge's target use cases do
not include a local Registrar.
This kind of non-network onboarding is sometimes called "Application
Onboarding", as the purpose is typically to deploy a credential that
will be used by the device in its intended use. For instance, a SIP
[RFC3261] phone might have a client certificate to be used with a SIP
proxy.
This document further specifies use of a BRSKI Cloud Registrar and
clarifies operations that are left out of scope in [BRSKI]. Two
modes of operation are specified in this document. The Cloud
Registrar MAY redirect the Pledge to the owner's Registrar, or the
Cloud Registrar MAY issue a voucher to the Pledge that includes the
domain of the owner's Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030]
(EST) server.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terms Pledge, Registrar, MASA, and Voucher
from [BRSKI] and [RFC8366].
Cloud Registrar: The default Registrar that is deployed at a URI
that is well known to the Pledge.
EST: Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030].
Local Domain: The domain where the Pledge is physically located and
bootstrapping from. This may be different from the Pledge owner's
domain.
Manufacturer: The term manufacturer is used throughout this document
as the entity that created the Pledge. This is typically the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM), but in more complex
situations, it could be a value added retailer (VAR), or possibly
even a systems integrator. Refer to [BRSKI] for more detailed
descriptions of manufacturer, VAR and OEM.
Owner Domain: The domain that the Pledge needs to discover and
bootstrap with.
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Owner Registrar: The Registrar that is operated by the Owner, or the
Owner's delegate. There may not be an Owner Registrar in all
deployment scenarios.
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer. The company that created the
device.
Provisional TLS: A mechanism defined in Section 5.1 of [BRSKI]
whereby a Pledge establishes a provisional TLS connection with a
Registrar before the Pledge is provisioned with a trust anchor
that can be used for verifying the Registrar identity.
SIP: Session Initiation Protocol defined in [RFC3261]
VAR: Value Added Reseller. A VAR will often collect products from
many OEMs, creating a complete solution, and then sells that
composite solution to end customers. A VAR will often need to
provision products to be operate in a specific manner. For
instance, a VoIP phone might have SIP functionality as well as
MGCP functionality, but in a particular deployment, only one will
be used.
Cloud VAR Registrar: The non-default Registrar that is operated by a
value added reseller (VAR).
1.2. Target Use Cases
This document specifies procedures for two high-level use cases.
* Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar: The operator-
maintained infrastructure supports BRSKI and has a BRSKI Registrar
deployed. More details are provided in Section 1.2.1.
* Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST Service: The operator-
maintained infrastructure does not support BRSKI, does not have a
BRSKI Registrar deployed, but does have an Enrollment over Secure
Transport (EST) [RFC7030] service deployed. More detailed are
provided in Section 1.2.2.
In both uses cases the procedures specifed here aid with the use of
BRSKI in many small sites, such as teleworkers working from home,
with minimum expectations against their network infrastructure.
The procedures defined in this document also support situations where
a manufacturer sells a number of devices (in bulk) to a Value Added
Reseller (VAR). The manufacturer knows which devices have been sold
to which VAR, but not who the ultimate owner will be. The VAR then
sells devices to other entities, such as enterprises, and records
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this in the VARs Cloud Registrar. Specifically, the VAR will record
that a specific device has been sold to an enterprise, and will know
that when this device bootstraps it should be redirected to the
enterprise's Owner Registrar or Owner EST Service.
A typical example is a VoIP phone manufacturer provides telephones to
a local system integration company (a VAR). The VAR records this
sale in its Cloud VAR Registrar system. The VAR has sold a VoIP
system to an enterprise (e.g., a SIP PBX). When a new employee needs
a phone at their home office, the VAR ships that unit across town to
the employee. When the employee plugs in the device and turns it on,
the device will be provisioned with a LDevID and configuration that
connections the phone with the Enterprises' VoIP PBX. The home
employee's network has no special provisions.
The procedures define in this document also support a chain of VARs
through chained HTTP redirects. This also supports a situation where
in effect, a large enterprise might also stock devices in a central
location.
The Pledge is not expected to know whether the operator-maintained
infrastructure has a BRSKI Registrar deployed or not. The Pledge
determines this based upon the response to its Voucher Request
message that it receives from the Cloud Registrar. The Cloud
Registrar is expected to determine whether the operator-maintained
infrastructure has a BRSKI Registrar deployed based upon the identity
presented by the Pledge.
A Cloud Registrar will receive BRSKI communications from all devices
configured with its URI. This could be, for example, all devices of
a particular product line from a particular manufacturer. When this
is a significantly large number, a Cloud Registrar may need to be
scaled with the usual web-service scaling mechanisms.
1.2.1. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar
A Pledge is bootstrapping from a location with no local domain
Registrar (for example, the small site or teleworker use case with no
local infrastructure to provide for automated discovery), and needs
to discover its Owner Registrar. The Cloud Registrar is used by the
Pledge to discover the Owner Registrar. The Cloud Registrar
redirects the Pledge to the Owner Registrar, and the Pledge completes
bootstrap against the Owner Registrar.
This mechanism is useful to help an employee who is deploying a
Pledge in a home or small branch office, where the Pledge belongs to
the employer. As there is no local domain Registrar in the
employee's local network, the Pledge needs to discover and bootstrap
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with the employer's Registrar which is deployed within the employer's
network, and the Pledge needs the keying material to trust the
Registrar. As a very specific example, an employee is deploying an
IP phone in a home office and the phone needs to register to an IP
PBX deployed in their employer's office.
Protocol details for this use case are provided in Section 4.1.
1.2.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST Service
A Pledge is bootstrapping where the owner organization does not yet
have an Owner Registrar deployed, but does have an EST service
deployed. The Cloud Registrar issues a voucher, and the Pledge
completes trust bootstrap using the Cloud Registrar. The voucher
issued by the cloud includes domain information for the owner's EST
service that the Pledge should use for certificate enrollment.
For example, an organization has an EST service deployed, but does
not have yet a BRSKI-capable Registrar service deployed. The Pledge
is deployed in the organization's domain, but does not discover a
local domain Registrar or Owner Registrar. The Pledge uses the Cloud
Registrar to bootstrap, and the Cloud Registrar provides a voucher
that includes instructions on finding the organization's EST service.
This option can be used to introduce the benefits of BRSKI for an
initial period when BRSKI is not available in existing EST-Servers.
Additionally, it can also be used long-term as a security-equivalent
solution in which BRSKI and EST-Server are set up in a modular
fashion.
The use of an EST-Server instead of a BRSKI Registrar may mean that
not all the EST options required by [BRSKI] may be available and
hence this option may not support all BRSKI deployment cases. For
example, certificates to enroll into an ACP [RFC8994] needs to
include an AcpNodeName (see [RFC8994], Section 6.2.2, which non-
BRSKI-capable EST-Servers may not support.
Protocol details for this use case are provided in Section 4.2.
2. Architecture
The high-level architectures for the two high-level use cases are
illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
In both use cases, the Pledge connects to the Cloud Registrar during
bootstrap.
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For use case one, as described in Section 1.2.1, the Cloud Registrar
redirects the Pledge to an Owner Registrar in order to complete
bootstrap with the Owner Registrar. When bootstrapping against an
Owner Registrar, the Owner Registrar will interact with a CA to
assist in issuing certificates to the Pledge. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.
For use case two, as described Section 1.2.2, the Cloud Registrar
issues a voucher itself without redirecting the Pledge to an Owner
Registrar. The Cloud Registrar will inform the Pledge what domain to
use for accessing EST services in the voucher response. In this
model, the Pledge interacts directly with the EST service to enroll.
The EST service will interact with a CA to assist in issuing a
certificate to the Pledge. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
It is also possible that the Cloud Registrar MAY redirect the Pledge
to another Cloud Registrar operated by a VAR, with that VAR's Cloud
Registrar then redirecting the Pledge to the Owner Registrar. This
scenario is discussed further in Sections Section 7.2 and 8.3.
The mechanisms and protocols by which the Registrar or EST service
interacts with the CA are transparent to the Pledge and are outside
the scope of this document.
The architectures show the Cloud Registrar and MASA as being
logically separate entities. The two functions could of course be
integrated into a single entity.
There are two different mechanisms for a Cloud Registrar to handle
voucher requests. It can redirect the request to the Owner Registrar
for handling, or it can return a voucher that includes an est-domain
attribute that points to the Owner EST Service. When returning a
voucher, additional bootstrapping information is embedded in the
voucher. Both mechanisms are described in detail later in this
document.
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|<--------------OWNER--------------------------->| MANUFACTURER
On-site Cloud
+--------+ +-----------+
| Pledge |------------------------------------------| Cloud |
+--------+ | Registrar |
| +-+---------+
| | BRSKI-MASA
| +-----------+ +-+---------+
+---------------->| Owner |-----------------| MASA |
VR-sign(N) | Registrar |sign(VR-sign(N)) +-----------+
+-----------+
| +-----------+
+----| CA |
+-----------+
Figure 1: Architecture: Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner
Registrar
|<--------------OWNER--------------------------->| MANUFACTURER
On-site Cloud
+--------+ +-----------+
| Pledge |------------------------------------------| Cloud |
+--------+ | Registrar |
| +--+--------+
| | BRSKI-MASA
| +--+--------+
| | MASA |
| +-----------+
| +-----------+
+-----------------| EST |
| Server |
+-----------+
| +-----------+
+--->| CA |
+-----------+
Figure 2: Architecture: Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner
EST Service
As depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, there are a number of parties
involved in the process. The Manufacturer, or Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) builds the device, but also is expected to run the
MASA, or arrange for it to exist. The interation between the Cloud
Registrar and the MASA is described by [BRSKI], Section 5.4.
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The network operator or enterprise is the intended owner of the new
device: the Pledge. This could be the enterprise itself, or in many
cases there is some outsourced IT department that might be involved.
They are the operator of the Registrar or EST Server. They may also
operate the CA, or they may contract those services from another
entity.
There is a potential additional party involved who may operate the
Cloud Registrar: the value added reseller (VAR). The VAR works with
the OEM to ship products with the right configuration to the owner.
For example, SIP telephones or other conferencing systems may be
installed by this VAR, often shipped directly from a warehouse to the
customer's remote office location. The VAR and manufacturer are
aware of which devices have been shipped to the VAR through sales
channel integrations, and so the manufacturer's Cloud Registrar is
able to redirect the Pledge through a chain of Cloud Registrars, as
explained in Section 3.3.1.
2.1. Network Connectivity
The assumption is that the Pledge already has network connectivity
prior to connecting to the Cloud Registrar. The Pledge must have an
IP address so that it is able to make DNS queries, and be able to
send requests to the Cloud Registrar. There are many ways to
accomplish this, from routable IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, to use of
NAT44, to using HTTP or SOCKS proxies. There are DHCP options that a
network operator can configure to accomplish any of these options.
The Pledge operator has already connected the Pledge to the network,
and the mechanism by which this has happened is out of scope of this
document. For many telephony applications, this is typically going
to be a wired connection. For wireless use cases, existing Wi-Fi
onboarding mechanisms such as [WPS] can be used.
Similarly, what address space the IP address belongs to, whether it
is an IPv4 or IPv6 address, or if there are firewalls or proxies
deployed between the Pledge and the cloud registrar are all out of
scope of this document.
2.2. Pledge Certificate Identity Considerations
Section 5.9.2 of [BRSKI] specifies that the Pledge MUST send an EST
[RFC7030] CSR Attributes request to the EST server before it requests
a client certificate. For the use case described in Section 1.2.1,
the Owner Registrar operates as the EST server as described in
[BRSKI], Section 2.5.3, and the Pledge sends the CSR Attributes
request to the Owner Registrar. For the use case described in
Section 1.2.2, the EST server operates as described in [RFC7030], and
the Pledge sends the CSR Attributes request to the EST server. Note
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that the Pledge only sends the CSR Attributes request to the entity
acting as the EST server as per Section 2.6 of [RFC7030], and MUST
NOT send the CSR Attributes request to the Cloud Registrar, because
the Cloud Registrar does not have authority to issue a certificate
for the customer domain. (The Cloud Registrar is not a full EST
server) If a Pledge sends a CSR Attributes request to the Cloud
Registrar, then the Cloud Registrar MUST reply with 404 response
code.
The EST server MAY use this mechanism to instruct the Pledge about
the identities it should include in the CSR request it sends as part
of enrollment. The EST server MAY use this mechanism to tell the
Pledge what Subject or Subject Alternative Name identity information
to include in its CSR request. This can be useful if the Subject or
Subject Alternative Name identity must have a specific value in order
to complete enrollment with the CA.
EST [RFC7030] is not clear on how the CSR Attributes response should
be structured, and in particular is not clear on how a server can
instruct a client to include specific attribute values in its CSR.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs] clarifies how a server can use CSR
Attributes response to specify specific values for attributes that
the client should include in its CSR.
For example, the Pledge may only be aware of its IDevID Subject which
includes a manufacturer serial number, but must include a specific
fully qualified domain name in the CSR in order to complete domain
ownership proofs required by the CA.
As another example, the Registrar may deem the manufacturer serial
number in an IDevID as personally identifiable information, and may
want to specify a new random opaque identifier that the Pledge should
use in its CSR.
2.3. YANG extension for Voucher based redirect
[RFC8366bis] contains the two needed voucher extensions: est-domain
and additional-configuration which are needed when a client is
redirected to a local EST server.
3. Protocol Operation
This section outlines the high-level protocol requirements and
operations that take place. Section 4 outlines the exact sequence of
message interactions between the Pledge, the Cloud Registrar, the
Owner Registrar and the Owner EST server.
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3.1. Pledge Sends Voucher Request to Cloud Registrar
3.1.1. Cloud Registrar Discovery
BRSKI defines how a Pledge MAY contact a well-known URI of a Cloud
Registrar if a local domain Registrar cannot be discovered.
Additionally, certain Pledge types might never attempt to discover a
local domain Registrar and might automatically bootstrap against a
Cloud Registrar.
The details of the URI are manufacturer specific, with BRSKI giving
the example "brski-registrar.manufacturer.example.com".
The Pledge SHOULD be provided with the entire URI of the Cloud
Registrar, including the protocol and path components, which are
typically "https://" and "/.well-known/brski", respectively.
3.1.2. Pledge - Cloud Registrar TLS Establishment Details
According to [BRSKI], Section 2.7, the Pledge MUST use an Implicit
Trust Anchor database (see EST [RFC7030]) to authenticate the Cloud
Registrar service. The Pledge MUST establish a mutually
authenticated TLS connection with the Cloud Registrar. Unlike the
Provisional TLS procedures documented in Section 5.1 of [BRSKI], the
Pledge MUST NOT establish a Provisional TLS connection with the Cloud
Registrar.
Pledges MUST and Cloud/Owner Registrars SHOULD support the use of the
"server_name" TLS extension (SNI, [RFC6066]) when using TLS 1.2.
Support for SNI is mandatory with TLS 1.3.
Pledges SHOULD send a valid "server_name" extension (SNI) whenever
they know the domain name of the registrar they connect to. A Pledge
creating a Provisional TLS connection according to [BRSKI] will often
only know the link local IPv6 address of a Join Proxy that connects
it to the Registrar. Registrars are accordingly expected to ignore
SNI information, as in most cases, the Pledge will not know how to
set the SNI correctly.
The Pledge MUST be manufactured with preloaded trust anchors that are
used to verify the identity of the Cloud Registrar when establishing
the TLS connection. The TLS connection can be verified using a
public Web PKI trust anchor using [RFC9525] DNS-ID mechanisms or a
pinned certification authority. This is a local implementation
decision. Refer to Section 8.2 for trust anchor security
considerations.
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The Cloud Registrar MUST verify the identity of the Pledge by sending
a TLS CertificateRequest message to the Pledge during TLS session
establishment. The Cloud Registrar MAY include a
certificate_authorities field in the message to specify the set of
allowed IDevID issuing CAs that Pledges MAY use when establishing
connections with the Cloud Registrar.
In addition to other protections against DoS attacks, the Cloud
Registrar is able to reject TLS connections when it can determine
during TLS authentication that it cannot support the Pledge. For
example, the Pledge cannot provide an IDevID signed by a CA
recognized/supported by the Cloud Registrar.
3.1.3. Pledge Sends Voucher Request Message
After the Pledge has established a mutually authenticated TLS
connection with the Cloud Registrar, the Pledge generates a voucher
request message as outlined in Section 5.2 of [BRSKI], and sends the
voucher request message to the Cloud Registrar.
3.2. Cloud Registrar Processes Voucher Request Message
The Cloud Registrar MUST determine Pledge ownership. Prior to
ownership determination, the Registrar checks the request for
correctness and if it is unwilling or unable to handle the request,
it MUST return a suitable 4xx or 5xx error response to the Pledge as
defined by [BRSKI] and HTTP. The Registrar returns the following
errors:
* in the case of an unknown Pledge, a 404 is returned.
* for a malformed request, 400 is returned.
* in case of server overload, 503 is returned.
If the request is correct and the Registrar is able to handle it, but
unable to determine ownership at that time, then it MUST return a 401
Unauthorized response to the Pledge. This signals to the Pledge that
there is currently no known owner domain for it, but that retrying
later might resolve this situation. In this scenario, the Registrar
SHOULD include a Retry-After header that includes a time to defer.
The absense of a Retry-After header indicates to the Pledge not to
attempt again. The Pledge MUST restart the bootstrapping process
from the beginning.
A Pledge with some kind of indicator (such as a screen or LED) SHOULD
consider all 4xx and 5xx errors to be a bootstrapping failure, and
indicate this to the operator.
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If the Cloud Registrar successfully determines ownership, then it
MUST take one of the following actions:
* error: return a suitable 4xx or 5xx error response (as defined by
[BRSKI] and HTTP) to the Pledge if the request processing failed
for any reason.
* redirect to Owner Registrar: redirect the Pledge to an Owner
Registrar via 307 response code.
* redirect to owner EST server: issue a voucher (containing an est-
domain attribute) and return a 200 response code.
3.2.1. Pledge Ownership Look Up
The Cloud Registrar needs some suitable mechanism for knowing the
correct owner of a connecting Pledge based on the presented identity
certificate. For example, if the Pledge establishes TLS using an
IDevID that is signed by a known manufacturing CA, the Registrar
could extract the serial number from the IDevID and use this to look
up a database of Pledge IDevID serial numbers to owners.
The mechanism by which the Cloud Registrar determines Pledge
ownership is, however, outside the scope of this document. The Cloud
Registrar is strongly tied to the manufacturers' processes for device
identity.
3.2.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar
Once the Cloud Registrar has determined Pledge ownership, the Cloud
Registrar MAY redirect the Pledge to the Owner Registrar in order to
complete bootstrap. If the owner wants the Cloud Registrar to
redirect Pledges to their Owner Registrar, the owner must register
their Owner Registrar URI with cloud Registrar. The mechanism by
which Pledge owners register their Owner Registrar URI with the Cloud
Registrar is outside the scope of this document.
In case of redirection, the Cloud Registrar replies to the voucher
request with an HTTP 307 Temporary Redirect response code, including
the owner's local domain in the HTTP Location header.
3.2.3. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST Service
If the Cloud Registrar issues a voucher, it returns the voucher in an
HTTP response with a 200 response code.
The Cloud Registrar MAY issue a 202 response code if it is willing to
issue a voucher, but will take some time to prepare the voucher.
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The voucher MUST include the new "est-domain" field as defined in
[RFC8366bis]. This tells the Pledge where the domain of the EST
service to use for completing certificate enrollment.
The voucher MAY include the new "additional-configuration" field.
This field points the Pledge to a URI where Pledge specific
additional configuration information SHOULD be retrieved. For
example, a SIP phone might retrieve a manufacturer specific
configuration file that contains information about how to do SIP
Registration. One advantage of this mechanism over current
mechanisms like DHCP options 120 defined in [RFC3361] or option 125
defined in [RFC3925] is that the voucher is returned in a
confidential (TLS-protected) transport, and so can include device-
specific credentials for retrieval of the configuration.
The exact Pledge and Registrar behavior for handling and specifying
the "additional-configuration" field is outside the scope of this
document.
3.3. Pledge Handles Cloud Registrar Response
3.3.1. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar
The Cloud Registrar has returned a 307 response to a voucher request.
The Cloud Registrar MAY be redirecting the Pledge to the Owner
Registrar, or to a different Cloud Registrar operated by a VAR.
The Pledge MUST restart its bootstrapping process by sending a new
voucher request message (with a fresh nonce) using the location
provided in the HTTP redirect.
The Pledge MUST attempt to validate the identity of the Cloud VAR
Registrar specified in the 307 response using its Implicit Trust
Anchor Database. If validation of this identity succeeds using the
Implicit Trust Anchor Database, then the Pledge MAY accept a
subsequent 307 response from this Cloud VAR Registrar.
The Pledge MAY continue to follow a number of 307 redirects provided
that each 307 redirect target Registrar identity is validated using
the Implicit Trust Anchor Database.
However, if validation of a 307 redirect target Registrar identity
using the Implicit Trust Anchor Database fails, then the Pledge MUST
NOT accept the 307 responses from the Registrar. At this point, the
TLS connection that has been established is considered a Provisional
TLS, as per Section 5.1 of [BRSKI].
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The Pledge then (re)sends a voucher-request on this connection. As
explained by [BRSKI], the connection is validated using the pinned
credential from the voucher.
The Pledge MUST process any error messages as defined in [BRSKI], and
in case of error MUST restart the process from its provisioned Cloud
Registrar. The exception is that a 401 Unauthorized code SHOULD
cause the Pledge to retry a number of times over a period of a few
hours.
In order to avoid permanent bootstrap cycles, the Pledge MUST NOT
revisit a prior location. Section 7.2 further outlines risks
associated with redirects. However, in some scenarios, Pledges MAY
visit the current location multiple times, for example when handling
a 401 Unauthorized response, or when handling a 503 Service
Unavailable that includes a Retry-After HTTP header. If it happens
that a location is repeated, then the Pledge MUST fail the
bootstrapping attempt and go back to the beginning, which includes
listening to other sources of bootstrapping information as specified
in [BRSKI] section 4.1 and 5.0. The Pledge MUST also have a limit on
the total number of redirects it will a follow, as the cycle
detection requires that it keep track of the places it has been.
That limit MUST be in the dozens or more redirects such that no
reasonable delegation path would be affected.
When the Pledge cannot validate the connection, then it MUST
establish a Provisional TLS connection with the specified local
domain Registrar at the location specified.
The Pledge then sends a voucher request message via the local domain
Registrar.
After the Pledge receives the voucher, it verifies the TLS connection
to the local domain Registrar and continues with enrollment and
bootstrap as per standard BRSKI operation.
The Pledge MUST process any error messages as defined in [BRSKI], and
in case of error MUST restart the process from its provisioned Cloud
Registrar.
The exception is that a 401 Unauthorized code SHOULD cause the Pledge
to retry a number of times over a period of a few hours.
3.3.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST Service
The Cloud Registrar returned a voucher to the Pledge. The Pledge
MUST perform voucher verification as per Section 5.6.1 of [BRSKI].
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The Pledge SHOULD extract the "est-domain" field from the voucher,
and SHOULD continue with EST enrollment as per standard EST
operation. Note that the Pledge has been instructed to connect to
the EST server specified in the "est-domain" field, and therefore
SHOULD use EST mechanisms, and not BRSKI mechanisms, when connecting
to the EST server.
4. Protocol Details
4.1. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner Registrar
This flow illustrates the "Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner
Registrar" use case. A Pledge is bootstrapping in a remote location
with no local domain Registrar. The assumption is that the Owner
Registrar domain is accessible, and the Pledge can establish a
network connection with the Owner Registrar. This may require that
the owner network firewall exposes the Owner Registrar on the public
internet.
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+--------+ +----------+
| Pledge | | Cloud |
| | |Registrar |
+--------+ +----------+
| |
| 1. Mutually-authenticated TLS |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| |
| 2. Voucher Request |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| 3. 307 Location: owner-ra.example.com |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
|
| +-----------+ +---------+
| | Owner | | MASA |
| | Registrar | | |
| +-----------+ +---------+
| 4. Provisional TLS | |
|<-------------------->| |
| | |
| 5. Voucher Request | |
|--------------------->| 6. Voucher Request |
| |------------------------->|
| | |
| | 7. Voucher Response |
| |<-------------------------|
| 8. Voucher Response | |
|<---------------------| |
| | |
| 9. Verify TLS | |
|<-------------------->| |
| | |
| 10. EST enroll |
|--------------------->|
|<---------------------|
The process starts, in step 1, when the Pledge establishes a Mutual
TLS channel with the Cloud Registrar using the IDevID certificate and
the trust anchors created during the manufacturing process of the
Pledge.
In step 2, the Pledge sends a voucher request to the Cloud Registrar.
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The Cloud Registrar determines Pledge ownership look up as outlined
in Section 3.2.1, and determines the Owner Registrar domain. In step
3, the Cloud Registrar redirects the Pledge to the Owner Registrar
domain.
Steps 4 and onwards follow the standard BRSKI flow, which includes
doing EST enroll operations. The Pledge establishes a Provisional
TLS connection with the Owner Registrar, and sends a voucher request
to the Owner Registrar. The Registrar forwards the voucher request
to the MASA. Assuming the MASA issues a voucher, then the Pledge
verifies the TLS connection with the Registrar using the pinned-
domain-cert from the voucher and completes the BRSKI flow.
4.2. Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner EST Service
This flow illustrates the "Bootstrap via Cloud Registrar and Owner
EST Service" use case. A Pledge is bootstrapping in a location with
no local domain Registrar. The Cloud Registrar is instructing the
Pledge to connect directly to an EST server for enrollment using EST
mechanisms. The assumption is that the EST domain is accessible, and
the Pledge can establish a network connection with the EST server.
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+--------+ +----------+
| Pledge | | Cloud |
| | |Registrar |
| | | / MASA |
+--------+ +----------+
| |
| 1. Mutually-authenticated TLS |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| |
| 2. Voucher Request |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| 3. Voucher Response {est-domain:fqdn} |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| +----------+ |
| | RFC7030 | |
| | EST | |
| | Server | |
| +----------+ |
| | |
| 4. Authenticated TLS | |
|<-------------------->| |
| |
| 5a. /voucher_status POST success |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| ON FAILURE 5b. /voucher_status POST |
| |
| 6. EST Enroll | |
|--------------------->| |
| | |
| 7. Certificate | |
|<---------------------| |
| | |
| 8. /enrollstatus | |
|--------------------->| |
The process starts, in step 1, when the Pledge establishes a Mutual
TLS channel with the Cloud Registrar/MASA using artifacts created
during the manufacturing process of the Pledge.
In step 2, the Pledge sends a voucher request to the Cloud Registrar/
MASA.
In step 3, the the Cloud Registrar/MASA replies to the Pledge with an
[RFC8366bis] format voucher that includes its assigned EST domain in
the est-domain attribute.
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In step 4, the Pledge establishes a TLS connection with the EST RA
specified in the voucher est-domain attribute. The connection may
involve crossing the Internet requiring a DNS look up on the provided
name. It MAY also be a local address that includes an IP address
literal including both IPv4 [RFC1918] and IPv6 Unique Local Addresses
[RFC4193]. The artifact provided in the pinned-domain-cert is
trusted as a trust anchor, and is used to verify the EST server
identity. The EST server identity MUST be verified using the pinned-
domain-cert value provided in the voucher as described in [RFC7030]
section 3.3.1.
There is a case where the pinned-domain-cert is the identical End-
Entity (EE) Certificate as the EST server. It also explicitly
includes the case where the EST server has a self-signed EE
Certificate, but it MAY also be an EE certificate that is part of a
larger PKI. If the certificate is not a self-signed or EE
certificate, then the Pledge SHOULD apply [RFC9525] DNS-ID
verification on the certificate against the domain provided in the
est-domain attribute. If the est-domain was provided with an IP
address literal, then it is unlikely that it can be verified, and in
that case, it is expected that either a self-signed certificate or an
EE certificate will be pinned by the voucher.
The Pledge also has the details it needs to be able to create the CSR
request to send to the RA based on the details provided in the
voucher.
In steps 5.a and 5.b, the Pledge MAY optionally notify the Cloud
Registrar/MASA of the success or failure of its attempt to establish
a secure TLS channel with the EST server. This is described in
[BRSKI], Section 5.7 This telemetry returns allow for the Registrar
to better provide diagnostics in the event of failure to onboard.
In step 6, the Pledge sends an EST Enroll request with the CSR.
In step 7, the EST server returns the requested certificate. The
Pledge must verify that the issued certificate has the expected
identifier obtained from the Cloud Registrar/MASA in step 3.
Step 8 is described in [BRSKI], Section 5.9.4, as the Enrollment
Status Telemetry. This telemetry return also allows for better
diagnostics in th event of a failure.
5. Lifecycle Considerations
BRSKI and the Cloud Registrar support provided in this document are
dependent upon the manufacturer maintaining the required
infrastructure.
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[BRSKI], Section 10.7 and Section 11.5 and 11.6 detail some
additional considerations about device vs manufacturer life span.
The well-known URL that is used is specified by the manufacturer when
designing its firmware, and is therefore completely under the
manufacturer's control. If the manufacturer wishes to change the
URL, or discontinue the service, then the manufacturer will need to
arrange for a firmware update where appropriate changes are made. In
the event of a merger between two companies, then the mechanism that
is described in section 7.2 MAY be applicable.
In the hosted Registrar, with an Owner EST Server Section 4.2 use
case, the Cloud Registrar MUST know the certificate for the EST
Server in order to pin it properly. In that case, when the owner of
the EST Server wishes to change their certificate, then they MUST
coordinate this with the upstream Cloud Registrar operator.
6. IANA Considerations
This document makes no IANA requests.
7. Implementation Considerations
7.1. Captive Portals
A Pledge might find itself deployed in a network where a captive
portal or an intelligent home gateway that provides access control on
all connections is also deployed. Captive portals that do not follow
the requirements of [RFC8952] section 1 MAY forcibly redirect HTTPS
connections. While this is a deprecated practice as it breaks TLS in
a way that most users can not deal with, it is still common in many
networks.
When the Pledge attempts to connect to the Cloud Registrar, an
incorrect connection will be detected because the Pledge will be
unable to verify the TLS connection to its Cloud Registrar via DNS-ID
check [RFC9525], Section 6.3. That is, the certificate returned from
the captive portal will not match.
At this point a network operator who controls the captive portal,
noticing the connection to what seems a legitimate destination (the
Cloud Registrar), MAY then permit that connection. This enables the
first connection to go through.
The connection is then redirected to the Registrar via 307, or to an
EST server via est-domain in a voucher. If it is a 307 redirect,
then a Provisional TLS connection will be initiated, and it will
succeed. The Provisional TLS connection does not do [RFC9525],
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Section 6.3 DNS-ID verification at the beginning of the connection,
so a forced redirection to a captive portal system will not be
detected. The subsequent BRSKI POST of a voucher will most likely be
met by a 404 or 500 HTTP code.
It is RECOMMENDED therefore that the Pledge look for [RFC8910]
attributes in DHCP, and if present, use the [RFC8908] API to learn if
it is captive.
The scenarios outlined here when a Pledge is deployed behind a
captive portal may result in failure scenarios, but do not constitute
a security risk, so long as the Pledge is correctly verifying all TLS
connections as per [BRSKI].
7.2. Multiple HTTP Redirects
If the Redirect to Registrar method is used, as described in
Section 4.1, there MAY be a series of 307 redirects. An example of
why this might occur is that the manufacturer only knows that it
resold the device to a particular value added reseller (VAR), and
there MAY be a chain of such VARs. It is important the Pledge avoid
being drawn into a loop of redirects. This could happen if a VAR
does not think they are authoritative for a particular device. A
"helpful" programmer might instead decide to redirect back to the
manufacturer in an attempt to restart at the top: perhaps there is
another process that updates the manufacturer's database and this
process is underway. Instead, the VAR MUST return a 404 error if it
cannot process the device. This will force the device to stop,
timeout, and then try all mechanisms again.
There are additional considerations regarding TLS certificate
validation that must be accounted for as outlined in Section 3.3.1.
If the Registrar returns a 307 response, the Pledge MUST NOT follow
this redirect if the Registrar identity was not validated using its
Implicit Trust Anchor Database. If the Registrar identity was
validated using the Implicit Trust Anchor Database, then the Pledge
MAY follow the redirect.
8. Security Considerations
The Cloud Registrar described in this document inherits all the
strong security properties that are described in [BRSKI], and none of
the security mechanisms that are defined in [BRSKI] are bypassed or
weakened by this document. The Cloud Registrar also inherits all the
potential issues that are described in [BRSKI]. This includes
dependency upon continued operation of the manufacturer provided
MASA, as well as potential complications where a manufacturer might
interfere with resale of a device.
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In addition to the dependency upon the MASA, the successful
enrollment of a device using a Cloud Registrar depends upon the
correct and continued operation of this new service. This internet
accessible service might be operated by the manufacturer and/or by
one or more value-added-resellers. All the considerations for
operation of the MASA also apply to operation of the Cloud Registrar.
8.1. Security Updates for the Pledge
Unlike many other uses of BRSKI, in the Cloud Registrar case it is
assumed that the Pledge has connected to a network, such as the
public Internet, on which some amount of connectivity is possible,
but there is no other local configuration available. (Note: there
are many possible configurations in which the device might not have
unlimited connectivity to the public Internet, but for which there
might be connectivity possible. For instance, the device could be
without a default route or NAT44, but able to make HTTP requests via
an HTTP proxy configured via DHCP)
There is another advantage to being online: the Pledge SHOULD contact
the manufacturer before bootstrapping in order to apply any available
firmware patches. Manufacturers are encouraged to make MUD [RFC8520]
files available, and in those definitions to allow for retrieval of
firmware updates. This may also include updates to the Implicit list
of Trust Anchors. In this way, a Pledge that may have been in a
dusty box in a warehouse for a long time can be updated to the latest
(exploit-free) firmware before attempting bootstrapping.
8.2. Trust Anchors for Cloud Registrar
In order to validate the HTTPS connections to the (series of) Cloud
Registrars, the Pledge will need to have an Implicit Trust Anchor
database, as described in [RFC7030], Section 3.6.1, to verify the
Cloud Registrar's certificate.
There is no requirement that Cloud Registrar's certificates are part
of the public (WebPKI) database, but it is likely simpler and cheaper
for most such systems to use easily obtained certificates.
Device manufacturers therefore need to include enough trust anchor in
their devices (the Pledges) so that all expected Cloud Registrar's
can be validated. This argues for including more trust anchors.
On the other hand, minimizing the number of trust anchors reduces the
security exposure should fraudulent certificates ever be issued.
More trust anchors also implies more maintenance to maintain and
update this Implicit Trust Anchor database as different certification
authorities renew their trust anchors.
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A device manufacturer could instead ship only their own internal,
private trust anchors for a PKI that the manufacturer operates. This
is described in in [I-D.irtf-t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors]
section 3. This would imply that all Cloud Registrars (likely
operated by VARs) would have to obtain a certificate from the
manufacturer. This has advantages in reliability and predictability,
but likely makes the Cloud Registrars much more costly to operate.
In particular, tying the VARs' Cloud Registrar to a single
manufacturer means that the VARs might have to operate a Cloud
Registrar for each brand of equipment that they represent.
The recommendation is therefore for manufacturers to work with their
VARs to determine if there is a subset of public PKIs that would
satisfy all their VARs, and to ship only that subset.
The final onboarding step, wherein an RFC8366 voucher artifact is
returned to authenticate the provisional TLS connection, can use any
kind of trust anchor: private or public. In most cases, the end
customer's Registrar will have a private PKI that will be pinned by
the voucher.
8.3. Considerations for HTTP Redirect
When the default Cloud Registrar redirects a Pledge using HTTP 307 to
an Owner Registrar, or another Cloud Registrar operated by a VAR, the
Pledge MUST have validated the TLS connection using an Implicit Trust
Anchor.
However, when connecting to the target Owner Registrar, a provisional
TLS connection is required as explained in [BRSKI], Section 5.1.
There is a conflict between these requirements: one says to validate,
and the other one says not to. This is resolved by having the Pledge
attempt validation, and if it succeeds, then an HTTP 307 redirect
will be accepted. If validation fails, then an HTTP 307 redirect
MUST be rejected as an error. If that occurs, then the onboarding
process SHOULD restart after a delay. This failure should be
reported to the initial Cloud Registrar via the mechanism described
in [BRSKI], Section 5.7.
Note that for use case two, in which redirection to an EST Server
occurs, then there is no provisional TLS connection at all. The
connection to the last Cloud Registrar is validated using the
Implicit Trust Database, while the EST Server connection is validated
by the certificate pinned by the Voucher artifact.
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8.4. Considerations for Voucher est-domain
A Cloud Registrar supporting the same set of Pledges as a MASA MAY be
integrated with the MASA to avoid the need for a network based API
between them, and without changing their external behavior as
specified here.
When a Cloud Registrar handles the scenario described in {bootstrap-
via-cloud-registrar-and-owner-est-service} by the returning "est-
domain" attribute in the voucher, the Cloud Registrar MUST do all the
voucher processing as specified in [BRSKI]. This is an example
deployment scenario where the Cloud Registrar MAY be operated by the
same entity as the MASA, and it MAY even be integrated with the MASA.
When a voucher is issued by the Cloud Registrar and that voucher
contains an "est-domain" attribute, the Pledge MUST verify the TLS
connection with this EST server using the "pinned-domain-cert"
attribute in the voucher.
The reduced operational security mechanisms outlined in [BRSKI]
sections 7.3 and 11 MAY be supported when the Pledge connects with
the EST server. These mechanisms reduce the security checks that
take place when the Pledge enrolls with the EST server. Refer to
[BRSKI] sections 7.3 and 11 for further details.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for their detailed
reviews: (ordered by last name): Esko Dijk, Toerless Eckert, Sheng
Jiang.
References
Normative References
[BRSKI] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs]
Richardson, M., Friel, O., von Oheimb, D., and D. Harkins,
"Clarification and enhancement of RFC7030 CSR Attributes
definition", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-18, 3 March 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
rfc7030-csrattrs-18>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.
[RFC8366bis]
Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., Eckert, T. T.,
and Q. Ma, "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping
Protocols", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
anima-rfc8366bis-13, 18 February 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
rfc8366bis-13>.
[RFC8994] Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8994>.
Informative References
[I-D.irtf-t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors]
Richardson, M., "A Taxonomy of operational security
considerations for manufacturer installed keys and Trust
Anchors", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-
t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors-05, 2 January 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-t2trg-
taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors-05>.
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[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.
J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918,
February 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1918>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3261>.
[RFC3361] Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP-for-IPv4) Option for Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) Servers", RFC 3361, DOI 10.17487/RFC3361, August
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3361>.
[RFC3925] Littlefield, J., "Vendor-Identifying Vendor Options for
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 4 (DHCPv4)",
RFC 3925, DOI 10.17487/RFC3925, October 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3925>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4193>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
[RFC8908] Pauly, T., Ed. and D. Thakore, Ed., "Captive Portal API",
RFC 8908, DOI 10.17487/RFC8908, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8908>.
[RFC8910] Kumari, W. and E. Kline, "Captive-Portal Identification in
DHCP and Router Advertisements (RAs)", RFC 8910,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8910, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8910>.
[RFC8952] Larose, K., Dolson, D., and H. Liu, "Captive Portal
Architecture", RFC 8952, DOI 10.17487/RFC8952, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8952>.
[RFC9525] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.
Friel, et al. Expires 4 September 2025 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft BRSKI-CLOUD March 2025
[WPS] Wi-Fi Alliance, "Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)", January
2025, <https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/wi-fi-
protected-setup>.
Authors' Addresses
Owen Friel
Cisco
Email: ofriel@cisco.com
Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
Ciena
Email: rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Friel, et al. Expires 4 September 2025 [Page 29]