Internet-Draft AIIP Architecture November 2025
Sogomonian Expires 6 May 2026 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Published:
Intended Status:
Experimental
Expires:
Author:
A. Sogomonian
Artificial Intelligence Internet Foundation (AIIF)

Architecture for the Artificial Intelligence Internet Protocol (AIIP)

Abstract

This document specifies the architectural model and core protocol behaviors for the Artificial Intelligence Internet Protocol (AIIP). AIIP provides a uniform way for agents, robots, tools, models, and services to be addressed and invoked either natively or through an HTTPS gateway. Beyond addressing, AIIP defines a stateless compute profile in which endpoints do not retain caller data and each invocation returns a signed execution receipt. Receipts are REQUIRED to be attested with Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) evidence and MAY additionally include zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). Receipts MAY also be anchored to external settlement systems without exposing user data.

Work in Progress

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2026.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

AIIP enables interoperable addressing and invocation of AI resources, including autonomous systems and human-facing services that delegate tasks to such systems. AIIP identifiers use the companion aiip URI scheme [AIIP-URI]. Interoperation with the existing Web is provided via an HTTPS gateway profile.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] and RFC 8174 [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Motivation and Global Demand for AIIP

Modern networks were designed for document delivery and passive data exchange over HTTP and HTTPS. Today, however, many connected systems perform physical actions with safety critical consequences. These systems require reliable control, safety enforcement, and verifiable execution guarantees beyond what HTTPS alone can provide.

AIIP introduces a trust layer for autonomy. It ensures that each invocation is performed under an authenticated and authorized identity, is governed by declared safety policies, and results in a signed execution receipt that can be audited.

A core requirement for autonomy is continuity. Network outages are inevitable, yet autonomous systems must remain operable and safe during disconnection.

AIIP establishes the AIID namespace, enabling the following properties:

With these properties, AIIP supports globally interoperable autonomy that is addressable, controllable, verifiable, and safe across both connected and disconnected conditions.

                      AUTONOMOUS ACTION (missing today)
                     +----------------------------------+
                     |   AIIP : Control, Safety,        |
                     |   Identity, Verifiable Trust     |
                     +----------------------------------+
                            ^
                            |
         +------------------+------------------+
         |                                     |
   HTTPS / HTTP                          IP Routing
(Document/Data Layer)            (Connectivity Only)
         +-------------------------------------+
Figure 1: AIIP fills the Trust and Autonomy Gap

3. Terminology

4. Architectural Overview

AIIP follows a resolve-invoke pattern. Given an aiip:// identifier, the client or gateway performs Resolution (Section 7) to obtain an Invocation Descriptor and then performs a Message Exchange (Section 8) with the resource.

 Client --(A)--> Resolver --(B)--> Resource
    |                     |
    +-- via HTTPS --Gateway+
(A) Resolve aiip://...  (B) Invoke per descriptor
Figure 2: Actors and Flows (simplified)

5. Identifiers and Namespace (Dual Model)

AIIP supports a dual namespace model to serve Web integrated services and autonomous objects:

  1. Domain Based Names (service oriented): authority is a DNS name. Example: aiip://bank.example/service/payments.

  2. Object Based Names (entity oriented): authority is an AIID allocated object namespace (for example aiid:org:1234) serialized into the authority or path. Example: aiip://id/aiid.org.1234/robot/forklift-42.

The AIIF Identifier Authority (AIID) MUST ensure global uniqueness for object based allocations and SHOULD publish delegation metadata usable by resolvers.

6. URI and Discovery (Summary)

The normative URI syntax is defined in [AIIP-URI] and follows the generic URI conventions of [RFC3986].

HTTPS discovery uses any of the following mechanisms:

Internationalization: non ASCII characters appearing in path or query components MUST be encoded in UTF-8 and the resulting octets MUST be percent encoded as per Section 3.1 of [RFC3987].

7. Resolution

Resolution maps an aiip:// URI to an Invocation Descriptor (IDesc). An IDesc is a small JSON object describing how to reach and authenticate to the resource.

{
  "version": "1",
  "endpoint": "mtls://robot-ctl.example:7443/act",
  "iface": "cmd.v1",
  "auth": { "scheme": "oauth2", "token_endpoint": "https://auth.example/token", "dpop": true },
  "proofs": { "jwks": "https://robot-ctl.example/.well-known/jwks.json", "result_sig": "JWS" }
}

Resolvers MUST validate the IDesc provenance and MUST reject conflicting or unverifiable data.

8. Message Model and Invocation

AIIP defines a simple request and response envelope that can be carried over different transports (HTTPS, mTLS TCP, QUIC). The envelope is JSON; binary payloads are carried via base64url fields.

{
  "id": "b7f7cfd2-6c38-4d7a-8e5a-6f1e1d9e0a10",
  "target": "aiip://id/aiid.org.1234/robot/forklift-42",
  "iface": "cmd.v1",
  "method": "move",
  "params": { "to": "A3", "speed": 0.5 },
  "proof": { "type": "DPoP", "jwk_thumbprint": "..." }
}

Results SHOULD be authenticity protected (for example detached JWS [JWS]) and include a monotonic timestamp and policy flags.

9. Compute Realm (Stateless Execution)

AIIP supports execution endpoints that do not retain caller data beyond the lifetime of a single invocation unless explicitly stated. Endpoints that do not persist data MUST advertise persistence equals none in their Invocation Descriptor.

Implementations SHOULD make determinism explicit. If execution is non deterministic, responses MUST include transcript or seed commitments sufficient for external verification.

10. Policy Aware Invocation and Safety Claims

AIIP resources MAY advertise policy claims in their IDesc indicating operational constraints that the endpoint enforces.

{
  "version": "1",
  "endpoint": "mtls://robot-ctl.example:7443/act",
  "iface": "cmd.v1",
  "policy": {
    "max_speed_mps": 0.5,
    "forbidden_zones": ["Z1","Z2"],
    "actuation": "allowed",
    "compliance": ["SOC2","ISO27001"]
  }
}

During network partition or degraded trust, endpoints MUST apply stricter safety defaults unless an explicit offline envelope authorizes otherwise.

11. Execution Receipts

Each successful invocation response MUST include a signed execution receipt proving that execution occurred under the advertised identity and policy. AIIP makes use of TEE based attestation evidence as defined by the RATS architecture [RFC9334]. Endpoints MAY additionally include zero knowledge proofs for enhanced trust minimization.

A receipt SHOULD contain a result commitment, execution transcript hash or equivalent, timestamp, algorithm identifiers, and the attestation evidence or ZKP object. Receipts MUST be JWS protected and verifiable using a JWKS referenced from the Invocation Descriptor.

12. Offline and Delay Tolerant Execution

AIIP supports disruption tolerant operation. When connectivity to external services is unavailable, endpoints MAY continue to operate within pre authorized offline envelopes.

Receipts generated offline MUST remain verifiable using local keys and SHOULD be synchronized when connectivity is restored.

13. Optional Settlement Anchors

Compute receipts MAY be anchored to external settlement systems to provide independent auditability and economic finality. Settlement anchoring is optional and MUST NOT expose plaintext inputs.

14. HTTPS Gateway Profile

A conforming gateway accepts HTTPS requests, validates embedded aiip:// URIs, performs Resolution, invokes the resource, and translates results into HTTP status codes and bodies.

15. Security Considerations

AIIP operations can trigger physical actions or financial effects. Implementations MUST authenticate peers, enforce authorization, and apply safety policy.

16. Privacy Considerations

Resolvers and gateways may expose metadata. Operators SHOULD minimize logging, apply retention limits, and prefer unlinkable proofs where feasible.

17. IANA Considerations

This document makes no IANA requests beyond referencing the provisional registration of the aiip URI scheme in [AIIP-URI].

18. Normative References

[AIIP-URI]
Sogomonian, A., "Artificial Intelligence Internet Protocol (AIIP) URI Scheme", , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sogomonian-aiip-uri-scheme/>.
[RFC3986]
Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 3986, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC3987]
Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987>.
[RFC8615]
Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 8615, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC8446]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9110]
Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "HTTP Semantics", RFC 9110, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, M., Fossati, T., Smith, N., and H. Tschofenig, "Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., and T. Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)", RFC 9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
[JWS]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

Author's Address

Aram Sogomonian
Artificial Intelligence Internet Foundation (AIIF)
United States of America